Neural Signatures of Economic Preferences for Risk and Ambiguity  by Huettel, Scott A. et al.
Neuron 49, 765–775, March 2, 2006 ª2006 Elsevier Inc. DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.01.024Neural Signatures of Economic
Preferences for Risk and AmbiguityScott A. Huettel,1,4,* C. Jill Stowe,2,4 Evan M. Gordon,1
Brent T. Warner,1 and Michael L. Platt3,4
1Brain Imaging and Analysis Center
Duke University Medical Center
Durham, North Carolina 27710
2Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27708
3Department of Neurobiology
Duke University Medical Center
Durham, North Carolina 27710
4Center for Neuroeconomic Studies
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27708
Summary
People often prefer the known over the unknown,
sometimes sacrificing potential rewards for the sake
of surety. Overcoming impulsive preferences for cer-
tainty in order to exploit uncertain but potentially lu-
crative options may require specialized neural mecha-
nisms. Here, we demonstrate by functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) that individuals’ prefer-
ences for risk (uncertainty with known probabilities)
and ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabili-
ties) predict brain activation associated with decision
making. Activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex
was predicted by ambiguity preference and was also
negatively correlated with an independent clinical
measure of behavioral impulsiveness, suggesting
that this region implements contextual analysis and
inhibits impulsive responses. In contrast, activation
of the posterior parietal cortex was predicted by risk
preference. Together, this novel double dissociation
indicates that decision making under ambiguity does
not represent a special, more complex case of risky
decision making; instead, these two forms of uncer-
tainty are supported by distinct mechanisms.
Introduction
Decisions are often made in the presence of uncer-
tainty about their outcomes. Uncertainty can refer to
risk, which is present when there are multiple possible
outcomes that could occur with well-defined or esti-
mable probabilities (Bernoulli, 1738). To account for
risk in decision making, early researchers developed
models based on expected utility theory; specifically,
the expected utility of a choice is the sum of probabil-
ity-weighted utilities for each possible outcome (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). The behavioral
and neural correlates of decision making under risk
have been frequently investigated: researchers have
found that individuals differ in their preference for
*Correspondence: scott.huettel@duke.edurisk, and components of risk like probability and re-
ward variance influence the activity of midbrain dopa-
mine neurons as well as the activation of ventral pre-
frontal, insular and cingulate cortices (Bechara et al.,
1999; Critchley et al., 2001; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Smith
et al., 2002).
Uncertainty can also refer to ambiguity (also called
Knightian uncertainty), which is present when there are
multiple possible outcomes whose probabilities are un-
known or are not well defined (Camerer and Weber,
1992; Ellsberg, 1961; Knight, 1921). Unlike risk in which
individuals can compute the expected utility of different
options, ambiguity renders the expected utility of differ-
ent options incalculable directly because probabilities
are unknown. Ambiguity poses a challenge for expected
utility theory because people often prefer options with
known probabilities to options with ambiguous proba-
bilities, even when these choices contradict expected
utility theory predictions (Becker and Brownson, 1964;
Chipman, 1960; Heath and Tversky, 1991; Lauriola and
Levin, 2001). Despite the prevalence of ambiguity in
real-world decisions, the neural mechanisms supporting
decision making under ambiguity—including whether
risky and ambiguous contexts for decision making
even evoke distinct neural processes—remain unknown
(but see Hsu et al. [2005]).
We contrasted decision making in contexts with risk
and ambiguity by examining choices between monetary
gambles while human subjects were scanned by func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Each gamble
involved a known outcome, a pair of outcomes with
known probabilities, or a pair of outcomes with unknown
probabilities (Figure 1A). We hereafter refer to these
three types of gambles as ‘‘certain,’’ ‘‘risky,’’ and ‘‘am-
biguous,’’ respectively. The ambiguous gambles were
resolved into risky or certain gambles following the sub-
jects’ overt choices; thus, they can be considered as
having a second-order probability distribution (Camerer
and Weber, 1992) rather than being of unknowable prob-
ability (Knight, 1921). On each trial, subjects viewed two
gambles of similar expected value and chose between
them (Figure 1B).
Critically for our planned analyses, we varied the
probabilities and values of the gambles across trials,
so that we could estimate our subjects’ preferences
for risk and ambiguity. Numerous studies have identified
brain regions within prefrontal and parietal cortices
whose activation increases during generalized decision
making (Bunge et al., 2002; Platt, 2002), is greater when
decisions involve risk (Paulus et al., 2001), and varies as
a function of the risk in a decision (Huettel et al., 2005;
Paulus et al., 2002; Volz et al., 2003). However, no prior
study has heretofore linked subjective economic prefer-
ences held by individuals and their associated patterns
of brain activation. Without evidence that activation in
a particular region varies with subjective economic pref-
erences, inferences about the causal mechanisms un-
derlying risky and ambiguous decision making will be
greatly limited. The goal of this study was to obtain
such evidence.
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(A) Subjects made decisions between pairs of
gambles, drawn from the following types:
certain, with a known outcome; risky, with
two outcomes with known probabilities; and
ambiguous, with two outcomes with un-
known probabilities. Probabilities and reward
values varied across trials, and expected
value was roughly matched between the
gambles.
(B) At the beginning of each trial, two gambles
were presented and the subjects indicated
their preference by pressing a joystick but-
ton. A square then appeared around the se-
lected gamble and any ambiguity was re-
vealed. Then, after a short delay, balls spun
around the edge of the gambles like roulette
wheels, and outcomes were indicated by
their final position and by text below the gam-
bles.Results
Response Time and Economic Preference
Parameters
Mean response time was fastest for decisions between
ambiguous and certain (AC) gambles (mean 6 st. dev.:
2.1 6 0.5 s), intermediate for decisions between ambig-
uous and risky (AR) (2.5 6 0.8 s) and between risky and
certain (RC) gambles (2.7 6 1.0 s), and slowest for deci-
sions between risky gambles (RR) (3.46 1.4 s). All differ-
ences between conditions were significant (pairwise t
tests; all p values <0.01), except for the comparison of
the AR and RC pairs (p > 0.1). Thus, decisions involving
ambiguity were at least as fast as decisions involving
only risk.
Using the choice history of each subject, we esti-
mated subjects’ preferences for ambiguity and risk, rep-
resented by the parameters a (Ghirardato et al., 2004)
and b respectively (see Experimental Procedures).
Values of a that are less than 0.5 indicate that a subjectwas ambiguity preferring, whereas values greater than
0.5 indicate ambiguity aversion. Similarly, values of
b greater than 1 indicate risk preferring behavior,
whereas values less than 1 indicate risk aversion. The
values of these parameters were uncorrelated across
subjects (R12 = 0.26, p > 0.1), indicating that for our sub-
ject sample and task, risk and ambiguity made indepen-
dent contributions to the decision process. Further-
more, the estimated parameters accurately predicted
our subjects’ choices in the experiment, even given the
near matching of expected value between gambles.
The subjects’ choices in the RC and RR conditions
were consistent with expected utility theory because
the estimates of b correctly predicted an average of
75% of the subjects’ choices, with a minimum of 68%
and a maximum of 86%. Likewise, subjects’ choices in
the AC and AR conditions were consistent with the the-
ory of a-maxmin expected utility: the estimates correctly
predicted an average of 79% of the subjects’ choices,
with a minimum of 71% and a maximum of 91%.
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767Table 1. Correlations between Cortical Activation and Behavioral Preferences
MNI Coordinates Correlation
Region BA x y z t Value p Value Ambig. (1-a) Risk (b) Impuls.
Right pIFS 9 39 16 33 7.2 0.000006 0.71 20.14 20.64
51 16 45 6.8 0.000009
Right pIFS 8 40 6 44 5.3 0.000094 0.70 20.20 20.35
Right aINS 13 41 19 9 5.5 0.000066 0.16 20.18 20.47
Left pPAR 40 236 257 50 7.3 0.000004 0.16 20.62 0.13
Shown are Brodmann Areas, stereotaxic coordinates, and significance values of frontal, insular, and parietal brain regions exhibiting significantly
greater activation to decisions involving unknown probabilities (ambiguity) compared to decisions involving known probabilities (risk). Correla-
tions are shown between differences in regression parameter estimates and the subjects’ behavioral parameter estimates for ambiguity prefer-
ence (1-a), risk preference (b), and impulsiveness (see also Figures 2 and 4). Boldface text indicates significance (p% 0.01, for correlations).Identification of Regions Exhibiting
Ambiguity Effects
We used event-related fMRI in conjunction with a gen-
eral linear model analysis to identify regions within the
brain that either exhibited activation to the decision
phase of the task across all conditions or exhibited in-
creased activation to decisions involving ambiguity
compared to those involving only risk. Decision-related
activation was observed in anterior and posterior lateral
prefrontal cortices, medial frontal cortex, insular cortex,
parietal cortex, the basal ganglia, and the thalamus.
These regions are typical of those found in studies of de-
cision making and executive processing (Huettel et al.,
2005; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Paulus et al., 2001) and
are not considered further in this manuscript.
However, a much more restricted set of regions (Table
1 and Figure 2A) showed a significantly different activa-
tion between gambles involving ambiguity and those in-
volving risk. These regions included the posterior infe-
rior frontal sulcus (pIFS) within lateral prefrontal cortex,
the anterior insular cortex (aINS), and posterior parietal
cortex (pPAR). Within pIFS, in particular, a dramatic ef-
fect of ambiguity was observed (Figures 2B and 2C).
At the outset of each trial, when subjects considered
their options and made a choice, activation was several
times greater for decisions involving ambiguity than de-
cisions involving risk. However, activation at the end of
the trial, associated with viewing the outcome, showed
a different dissociation: there was a greater response
in AR and RR trials compared to those with a certain
gamble. Thus, the modulatory consequences of ambi-
guity for pIFS were specific to the decision phase of
the task. Within aINS and pPAR, in contrast, increased
activation to trials with ambiguity was present but
much less pronounced (Figures 2B and 2C).
Predicting Prefrontal and Parietal Activation from
Economic Preferences
The results in Figure 2 demonstrate that activation within
a selected set of regions, notably the lateral prefrontal
cortex, increases when ambiguity is present. However,
these activations are not themselves sufficient for as-
signing function to these regions, in the absence of
any relation to behavior. Therefore, we next examined
the correlations between ambiguity and risk effects on
fMRI activation and subjects’ economic preference pa-
rameters. To obtain a measure of decision-related acti-
vation, we determined the amplitude of the decision-
phase regressors for each trial type within our analysismodel (see Experimental Procedures). These ‘‘fMRI pa-
rameter estimates’’ are not measures of absolute signal
intensity, nor do they signal the goodness of fit of the
model. Instead, they provide a measure of the relative
strength of the neural response that can be attributed
to each trial type during the decision phase.
We first used the single (mean) preference parameter
value for each subject that best predicted choices (Fig-
ure 3). Note that for ambiguity we plot the quantity 1-a,
rather than a, so that increasing values indicate increas-
ing ambiguity preference (as for risk). Across subjects,
the ambiguity effect in the fMRI signal ([AC + AR] 2
[RC + RR]) in pIFS was significantly and positively corre-
lated with the best-fit ambiguity preference quantity 1-a
(R12 = 0.71, p = 0.003); that is, ambiguity evoked the
greatest increase in pIFS activation in those subjects
who had the greatest preference for ambiguity. No other
region’s activation was significantly correlated with be-
havioral preferences for ambiguous options (all p’s >
0.1). We found the opposite effect in pPAR, for which
there was a significant correlation between the risk ef-
fect ([RC + RR] – [AC + AR]) and the best-fit risk prefer-
ence parameter b (R12 = 0.61, p = 0.01). That is, in-
creased preference for risk predicted a relative
increase in pPAR activation on risky trials. No other re-
gion’s activation was significantly correlated with risk
preference (all p’s > 0.1). We additionally evaluated
whether these significant correlations might have been
influenced by outliers by removing each of the subjects
in turn and repeating the correlation analysis with the re-
maining 12 subjects. In every case, the correlation was
significant at the p < 0.05 level (R11 > 0.47).
To verify the robustness of these brain-behavior rela-
tions, we used a resampling procedure, as described in
the Experimental Procedures. The results of the resam-
pling analysis (Figure 4) completely confirmed the pat-
tern observed when only using the mean parameter
values. Across all iterations, activation in the right pIFS
was significantly correlated with the ambiguity prefer-
ence quantity 1-a at p < 0.001 on 30.8% of iterations,
at p < 0.01 on 99.1% of iterations, and at p < 0.05 on
100% of iterations. A nonsignificant correlation (p >
0.05) was never observed across 10,000 samples. Simi-
lar analyses for ambiguity preferences were also con-
ducted for aINS and pPAR, but no samples were ob-
served with significant correlations (p < 0.05). When
examining samples of risk preference parameters, we
found that activation of the pPAR was significantly cor-
related with risk preference parameters on every sample
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ples in which pIFS or aINS activation correlated with risk
preference parameters.
The above analyses allow us to conclude that activity
in the lateral prefrontal cortex was predicted by ambigu-
ity preferences and activity in the posterior parietal cor-
Figure 2. Neural Substrates of Decision Making under Ambiguity
Revealed by fMRI
(A) During the decision phase of the task, increased activation when
ambiguity was present was found in the posterior part of the inferior
frontal sulcus (pIFS) of lateral prefrontal cortex, in anterior insular
cortex (aINS), and in posterior parietal cortex (pPAR). Slice locations
are indicated via y coordinates.
(B) Hemodynamic time courses in the pIFS region (centroid: 39, 16,
33), aINS region aINS (centroid: 41, 19, 9), and pPAR (centroid:236,
257, 50). Orange lines indicate decisions between ambiguous and
certain gambles (AC), red lines indicate decisions between ambigu-
ous and risky gambles (AR), cyan lines indicate decisions between
risky and certain gambles (RC), and blue lines indicate decisions be-
tween risky and risky gambles (RR). The timing and mean durations
of the three task phases are indicated schematically along the x axis:
deciding between the gambles (solid line), expectation of the out-
come of the gambles (dashed line), and reward presentation (dotted
line). For illustrative purposes, the time period at which the maxi-
mum fMRI effect would be expected is indicated via shading with
border indicating task phase. Visible is the large effect of ambiguity
in pIFS upon the decision phase.
(C) Bars indicate the amplitude of the regression parameter (6 stan-
dard error; expressed in arbitrary units) associated with the sub-
jects’ decision on each trial, for each of the four decision types
(same colors as in [B]). Activation in pIFS was significantly greater
for decisions involving ambiguity, with lesser but significant effects
found in aINS and pPAR.tex was predicted by risk preferences, across the entire
range of possible preference parameters derived from
our subject sample. However, they do not address the
question of whether the observed correlations were
greater in those regions than in other regions, e.g., that
ambiguity preferences had a stronger relation with
pIFS activation than aINS or pPAR activation. We con-
ducted two additional tests to address this question.
First, we set up a multiple regression analysis that exam-
ined the contributions of each of these three regions’ ac-
tivation toward predicting ambiguity or risk preferences.
We found that pIFS made a significant contribution (t9 =
2.9, p = 0.02) toward predicting ambiguity preferences,
but the other regions did not. For predicting risk prefer-
ences, the contribution of pPAR approached signifi-
cance (t9 = 2.19, p = 0.06), but no other region contrib-
uted. Second, we conducted Hotelling-Williams tests
to compare the relative significance of pairs of corre-
lated correlation coefficients. For ambiguity, we found
that the correlation with ambiguity preferences (i.e.,
1-a) was greater for pIFS than for either the aINS or
pPAR (both t10 = 1.8; p < 0.05, one-tailed). For risk, how-
ever, there was only a trend toward a significant differ-
ence, such that the correlation with b trended toward
Figure 3. Subjective Economic Preferences Predict Changes in
Brain Activation
Each subject’s mean preference value and fMRI parameter value is
indicated by a single square. Crosses indicate the point of neutral
ambiguity/risk preference (x axis) and the mean fMRI parameter es-
timate in that region (y axis). (A) Ambiguity effects were defined by
subtracting activation parameters associated with risk from activa-
tion parameters associated with ambiguity. In pIFS, we found a sig-
nificant positive correlation between the neural ambiguity effect in
pIFS and the ambiguity preference parameter 1-a (R12 = 0.71, p <
0.01); no significant ambiguity correlations were observed in aINS
or pPAR. (B) Risk effects were defined by subtracting activation pa-
rameters associated with ambiguity from activation parameters as-
sociated with risk (i.e., the opposite of the ambiguity effects). Within
pPAR there was a significant negative correlation between the ambi-
guity effect and the risk preference parameter b (R12 = 20.61, p =
0.01). There were no significant risk correlations for pIFS and aINS.
Neuroeconomic Preferences
769being larger for pPAR than for pIFS or aINS (both p’s <
0.10, one-tailed).
We thus can make two conclusions about the rela-
tions between economic preferences and brain activa-
tion. Preferences for ambiguity are predicted by activa-
tion in pIFS, and this relation is stronger in pIFS than in
any other region tested. Conversely, preferences for
risk are predicted by activation in pPAR; however, our
data do not rule out the possibility that the other regions
identified may similarly contribute to risk preferences.
Predicting Prefrontal Activation from
Behavioral Impulsiveness
The ambiguous stimuli used, by their very nature, are as-
sociated with a set of possible interpretations that might
range from very favorable to very unfavorable. Differ-
ences in individuals’ responses—whether neural or be-
havioral—to ambiguity might reflect their relative ten-
dency to consider these options. When subjects act
impulsively, failing to consider multiple contexts for a de-
cision stimulus, controlled decision making may be im-
peded, and maladaptive outcomes may be more likely
(Leland and Paulus, 2005). Inhibiting impulsive behavior
is perceived to be central to decision making (Chapman
and Niedermayer, 2001) and may be a cardinal function
of prefrontal cortex (Miller, 2000). We therefore hypoth-
esized that the behavioral trait of impulsiveness would
be more associated with the neural processing of ambi-
guity than of risk.
To evaluate this potential relation, we collected psy-
chometric data with the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
(BIS), 11th edition (Patton et al., 1995). The BIS com-
prises three subscales—Cognitive, Non-Planning, and
Motor—which together provide an overall measure of
impulsiveness. Normalized BIS values in educated
young adults are about 60 6 10 (mean 6 SD), with in-
creasing values indicating greater impulsiveness.
Across subjects, impulsiveness was not significantly
correlated with either ambiguity or risk preference pa-
rameters (p’s > 0.1). As expected, we found that sub-
Figure 4. A Double Dissociation between Economic Preferences
and fMRI Activation
To evaluate the robustness of the relations between ambiguity and
risk preferences and fMRI activation, we conducted a resampling
analysis in which we selected preference values randomly from
each subjects’ range of estimated values for both risk (b) and ambi-
guity (1-a). Shown are the correlations (mean 6 standard deviation)
obtained across 10,000 samples. A clear double dissociation was
observed: ambiguity preferences correlate with changes in brain ac-
tivation within pIFS, but not pPAR; risk preferences correlate with
changes in brain activation within pPAR, but not pIFS.jects who were more impulsive, as evinced by increased
BIS values, had faster response times than subjects
who were less impulsive (R9 =20.54, p = 0.05). This neg-
ative correlation was present for all four trial types: AC,
R9 = 20.61; AR, R9 = 20.54; RC, R9 = 20.50; and RR,
R9 = 20.49.
However, impulsiveness was significantly and nega-
tively correlated (Figure 5) with the ambiguity effect in
pIFS (R9 = 20.64, p = 0.02). Examination of subtests of
the BIS revealed that the pIFS ambiguity effect most
strongly correlated with cognitive impulsiveness (R9 =
20.70, p = 0.01), compared to nonplanning impulsive-
ness (R9 = 20.47, p = 0.08) and motor impulsiveness
(R9 =20.52, p = 0.06). No other region’s ambiguity effect
was predicted by behavioral impulsiveness at the p <
0.05 level (Figures 4B and 4C). However, within the ante-
rior insula, there was a trend toward a negative correla-
tion between the ambiguity effect and behavioral impul-
siveness (R9 = 20.47, p = 0.08). Examination of the
subtests of impulsiveness indicated that this effect
was driven by motor impulsiveness (R9 = 20.60, p =
0.03) because the cognitive and nonplanning effects
were nonsignificant (p’sR 0.2).
We examined whether these significant correlations
might have been influenced by outliers by removing
each of the subjects in turn and repeating the correlation
analysis with the remaining 12 subjects. For the correla-
tion between pIFS activation and the total BIS score, re-
moving the subject with the greatest BIS score caused
the correlation to drop below significance (R8 = 20.41,
Figure 5. Behavioral Impulsiveness Predicts Ambiguity Effects in
pIFS
(A) We additionally correlated behavioral impulsiveness, as indexed
by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), to ambiguity effects. Im-
pulsiveness significantly predicted activation in pIFS (R9 = 20.64,
p = 0.01), with a trend toward significance observed in aINS, and
no effect at all in pPAR.
(B) When considering only the Cognitive Impulsiveness subscale of
the BIS, the correlation increased slightly in pIFS but was completely
absent in the other regions. These results are consistent with the in-
terpretation that pIFS supports the consideration of multiple inter-
pretations of an ambiguous decision option, given that reduced
pIFS activation was found in subjects who are highly impulsive
and consider fewer decision options.
Neuron
770p > 0.1); this was not the case for any other subject (allR8
> 20.59, all p < 0.05). However, the correlation between
pIFS activation and cognitive impulsiveness was robust
to removal of any one subject (all R8 > 20.59, all p <
0.05). Regression analyses demonstrated that activation
of the pIFS (t[6] = 2.73, p < 0.05), but not of the aINS or
pPAR, predicted cognitive impulsiveness. No region’s
activation predicted a significant and independent com-
ponent of the variance in total BIS score (i.e., overall im-
pulsiveness). Note that the Hotelling-Williams test is not
meaningful for these data, given the relatively few de-
grees of freedom. We conclude that activation in pIFS,
unlike in other regions, mediates processes that counter
cognitive impulsiveness in decision making.
Discussion
Understanding how the brain deals with uncertainty and
how subjective economic preferences are represented
neurally are two of the central motivating problems of
the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics (Glimcher
and Rustichini, 2004). Our study provided three novel re-
sults with implications for addressing these problems.
First, we identified brain regions that showed a selective
increase in activation to decision making under ambigu-
ity, compared to decision making under risk. We dem-
onstrated that ambiguity modulates activation in a sub-
set of those regions generally activated by economic
decision making: the pIFS, the aINS, and the pPAR. Sec-
ond, we related, across subjects, changes in brain acti-
vation to calculated parameters representing economic
preferences. We demonstrated, for the first time, that
activation of specific brain regions is predictable based
on subjects’ economic preferences for ambiguity and
risk. Furthermore, different regions’ activations are
modulated by different parameters: the lateral prefrontal
cortex was modulated by preferences for ambiguity and
the posterior parietal cortex was modulated by prefer-
ences for risk. Finally, we showed that behavioral impul-
siveness also modulated activation in lateral prefrontal
cortex, with greater activation to ambiguous decisions
observed in less-impulsive subjects. Together these lat-
ter two results tell a simple and convergent story: that
the lateral prefrontal cortex supports processes related
to the successful resolution of ambiguity in decision
making.
The Role of the Lateral Prefrontal Cortex
in Resolving Uncertainty
The prefrontal cortex has been long considered to con-
tribute to abstract thought, higher cognition, and the ex-
ecutive control of behavior. As evidence from cognitive
neuroscience has refined this broad conception, there
has been increasing recognition that executive control
processes are specifically supported by regions along
the lateral surface of the frontal lobe that are anterior
to premotor regions and posterior to frontopolar cortex.
These regions have been proposed to support a primar-
ily regulative role, that of instantiating executive control
processes to support achievement of task goals
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Miller, 2000; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004).
Further, parsing the lateral prefrontal cortex into func-
tional regions has been an area of active and ongoing re-search, and several frameworks for its functional topog-
raphy have been advanced. Shared by most is a
distinction between two types of executive control
processes: contextual control, or the construction of
rules for behavior based upon the current context; and
episodic control, or the selection and initiation of the ap-
propriate behavior based upon the specific stimuli pre-
sented. In these frameworks, contextual control pro-
cesses are assigned to posterior regions and episodic
control processes are assigned to anterior regions. For
example, Koechlin and colleagues compared task cu-
ing, which was presumed to be primarily contextual,
and response cuing, which was presumed to be primar-
ily episodic (Koechlin et al., 2003). Activation to the con-
textual cuing was observed in posterior lateral prefrontal
cortex (centroid x, y, z: 36, 8, 28), which overlaps with the
pIFS activation from the present study, although their re-
gion tends to be more inferior and more left lateralized. A
similar conclusion was reached by Brass and von Cra-
mon (2004), who investigated the brain systems in-
volved in the selection of task context (i.e., what infor-
mation is relevant for a decision and in what context
that information should be evaluated). Although our eco-
nomic decision-making task differs greatly from the per-
ceptual cuing task of Brass and von Cramon, our activa-
tion foci in pIFS and pPAR mirror theirs (pIFS: 241, 18,
26; pPAR: 236, 257, 50), save that their pIFS activation
was lateralized to the left hemisphere.
These prior results suggest that the pIFS plays a par-
ticularly important role in assessing the context for deci-
sion making. But, why should this process (and not other
aspects of executive control) differ for ambiguous and
risky trials? We suggest that the cardinal requirement
for successfully dealing with ambiguity is behavioral
flexibility: when faced with an ambiguous situation,
one must resolve its multiplicity of interpretations into
a context that facilitates decision making. No such con-
text needs to be constructed in risky decision making
because all information is specified by the decision
problem. Although the need for contextual analysis dif-
ferentiates decision making under ambiguity and risk,
other processes are likely to be common across all
forms of decision making under uncertainty. These in-
clude episodic selection, which relies on anterior re-
gions of lateral prefrontal cortex (Huettel et al., 2002;
Rowe et al., 2000); performance monitoring, for which
anterior cingulate cortex may be critical (Kerns et al.,
2004); and learning stimulus-response contingencies,
which depends upon medial prefrontal cortex (Volz
et al., 2003). As noted briefly in the results, although
our study was designed to elucidate differences not
commonalities, activation in these regions was found
for all trial types in the decision phase.
We emphasize that further distinctions may be possi-
ble between subregions of posterior lateral prefrontal
cortex. Also observed was ambiguity-related activation
in a second, more posterior focus within the inferior fron-
tal sulcus; this region has been labeled the inferior fron-
tal junction (IFJ) and has approximate coordinates (44,
21, 38) (Brass and von Cramon, 2002). Comparisons
across studies have suggested that this region supports
task preparation, as needed when there are multiple
tasks in an experiment that are signaled by different
cues (Brass and von Cramon, 2002, 2004; Bunge et al.,
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making under ambiguity might reflect the subjects’
treatment of ambiguity as signaling a different decision
task than (the default) risk. However, it is notable that un-
like in the anterior pIFS, activation of this more-posterior
region did not track ambiguity preferences across our
subjects, so that it does not appear to be linked with pro-
cesses specific to ambiguity resolution.
Finally, activation of the lateral prefrontal cortex fre-
quently co-occurs with that of posterior parietal cortex,
suggesting that the two regions may each contribute to
executive control (at least in the form required for most
neuroimaging experiments). We observed two notable
differences between these regions. First, although acti-
vation in pPAR was greater on ambiguous trials than
nonambiguous trials, the differences were small com-
pared to those in pIFS. Second, the ambiguity effect in
pPAR was correlated with subjects’ risk preferences,
not their ambiguity preferences. That pPAR mediates
the evaluation of risky decisions is consistent with sin-
gle-unit studies in monkeys (Dorris and Glimcher,
2004; Sugrue et al., 2004), although the functional ho-
mologies between monkey and human posterior parietal
cortex have not yet been established. Whether the ob-
served risk effects in pPAR reflect differential demands
for spatial response selection (Brass and von Cramon,
2004), activation of response rules (Bunge et al., 2002),
analog calculation (Piazza et al., 2004), or another factor
remains an avenue for future study.
Ambiguity and Risk as Distinct Forms of Uncertainty
Ambiguity is of particular interest to economists and de-
cision scientists for several reasons: it is present in most
real-world decisions, it presents choice paradoxes for
which standard expected utility theory has difficulty ac-
counting, and it is specific to human-decision making, in
that its resolution requires communication or assess-
ment of a second-order expectation about probabilities.
In particular, understanding why and how people treat
subjective probabilities differently from objective prob-
abilities are central questions in economic thought
(Camerer and Weber, 1992; Knight, 1921). Distinctions
in neural function—and by inference, mental process—
may lead to their answers.
There have been two prior neuroscience studies that
manipulated ambiguity and risk in decision making,
both with positron emission tomography (PET). Smith
and colleagues evaluated how brain activation is influ-
enced by gain and loss contexts in ambiguous and risky
decisions (Smith et al., 2002); data are also reported in
(Dickhaut et al., 2003). Because of the temporal limita-
tions of PET, the same trial condition was presented re-
peatedly within individual blocks and thus analyses col-
lapsed across all phases of the task. A second study
from the same group overcame this limitation by with-
holding feedback until after the experiment, which al-
lows analysis of data associated with the choice phase
of the task (Rustichini et al., 2005). Across these two
studies, they found two primary differences between de-
cision making under risk and under ambiguity: that ef-
fects of gain/loss context, as found in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, were more pronounced for risky deci-
sions than ambiguous decisions; and that both ambigu-
ous and risky decisions evoke activation in parietal cor-tex, but not in lateral prefrontal cortex. These latter
results stand in opposition to those of the present study,
which showed clear evidence for lateral prefrontal cor-
tex activation in decision making under uncertainty
and for greater prefrontal activation when ambiguity
was present, and to the large prior literature document-
ing the role of lateral prefrontal cortex in risky decision
making. Thus, ours is the first study to link a specific re-
gion within prefrontal cortex, the pIFS, to decision mak-
ing under ambiguity.
Even given a clear dissociation between ambiguity
and risk, as operationalized in our task design, some
consideration must be paid to confounding factors.
Decisions under ambiguity and under risk might system-
atically differ in some secondary process—such as
attention, motor preparation, or rule induction—that dif-
ferentially drives activation in prefrontal and parietal cor-
tices. It is possible, for example, that that attentional
effects preferentially recruit lateral prefrontal cortex
compared to posterior parietal cortex, accounting for
the observed differences between ambiguity and risk.
However, we believe this to be unlikely. Both regions ex-
hibit attentional effects (with posterior parietal cortex
more typically implicated), and any story about atten-
tional differences associated with task difficulty and
complexity would be difficult to reconcile with the faster
response times observed on ambiguous trials.
Another potential explanation for the differences be-
tween prefrontal and parietal cortices could be that the
former supports motor preparation processes, which
might be more active for ambiguity than risk and might
be deficient in our impulsive subjects. This conjecture
is reasonable, given the contributions of premotor corti-
ces to motor execution and preparation and the sugges-
tions that posterior lateral prefrontal cortex supports
task planning (Brass and von Cramon, 2002; Dove
et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the ob-
served results argue against such an interpretation, for
three reasons. First, if motor preparatory processes
were engaged more rapidly and/or of more limited dura-
tion on trials with ambiguity, one would observe de-
creased activation in motor preparatory regions. How-
ever, we found a more than 2-fold increase in pIFS
activation when ambiguity was present. Second, there
were no significant effects of ambiguity in regions that
are commonly implicated in motor preparation, such
as the premotor cortex. Third, the amplitude of the
BOLD response in the pIFS across conditions (i.e.,
Figure 2B) perfectly tracks the presence/absence of am-
biguity (AC = AR > RC = RR) but is inconsistent with the
ordering of response time across conditions (RR > RC =
AR > AC).
Finally, we consider the possibility that the pIFS acti-
vation reflects processes associated with rule induction,
such that our ambiguity-preferring subjects were those
who devoted the most energy to uncovering a hidden
rule. Rule induction has been associated with the lateral
prefrontal cortex, although reported activations are typ-
ically in the left hemisphere and in regions anterior to
pIFS (Goel and Dolan, 2004). To control for the possibil-
ity that ambiguity-preferring subjects were spending
more time making decisions when ambiguity was pres-
ent, as would support this interpretation, we tested
whether there were positive correlations across
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time. Instead, there were nonsignificant negative corre-
lations both when combining across all trial types and
for every trial type independently (all Rs between
20.26 and 20.32). Likewise, as noted in the results, re-
sponse time decreased when ambiguity was present
and there was no correlation between ambiguity prefer-
ence and impulsiveness. We note that our subjects were
well practiced in the task, had substantial experience
with the distribution of probabilities, and received the
same information about rules regardless of their deci-
sion. Together, these results and design features reduce
the tenability of arguments that invoke an additional pro-
cess like rule induction that is expressed more in ambi-
guity-seeking subjects.
Yet, although our results do not support the direct
substitution of another cognitive process for ambiguity,
we cannot make a positive and definitive statement
about what processes together constitute decision
making under ambiguity. Defining what is meant by ‘‘at-
titudes toward ambiguity’’ has been and remains a chal-
lenge for economic theorists because no two individuals
necessarily perceive the same ambiguity in a decision
problem (Ghirardato et al., 2004). Whereas risk can be
defined in terms of certainty equivalents and expected
values, there is no analog in ambiguous choice. This
lack of a precise way to measure ambiguity attitudes
even suggests that one may go so far as to interpret am-
biguity preferring (averse) behavior as optimism (pessi-
mism) about true probabilities. As discussed in the fol-
lowing section, a salutary effect of neuroeconomic
research will be to provide evidence for or against the in-
volvement of particular processes in complex forms of
decision making.
Neuroeconomics: Predicting Brain Activation from
Economic Preferences
The present results demonstrate how neuroscience
data can inform theoretical perspectives in economics
(Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). Although behavioral ex-
periments have demonstrated that individuals treat am-
biguity differently from risk (Camerer and Weber, 1992;
Luce, 2000), current theories proposed to accommo-
date decision making under ambiguity make several as-
sumptions: that an individual’s beliefs about the proba-
bilities of each outcome are represented by a set of
(possibly subjective) probability distributions, that the
individual evaluates the expected utility of a choice ac-
cording to each possible distribution, and that the indi-
vidual then chooses one of the alternatives based on
some objective. These assumptions predict that the
processes evoked by risky decisions are subsumed
within those evoked by ambiguous decisions. Our
fMRI and response time results contradict this notion.
We suggest that ambiguous decision making does not
represent a special, more complex case of risky deci-
sion making; instead, these represent two types of deci-
sion making that are supported by distinct mechanisms.
The demonstration that activation of particular brain
regions tracks specific economic preferences heralds
a novel and potentially powerful approach for neuroeco-
nomic studies. Although it is readily apparent that indi-
viduals differ in their preferences for risk and ambiguity,
among other decision parameters (e.g., delayed versusimmediate rewards), there is no necessity that such dif-
ferences must be measurable by fMRI. Decision prefer-
ences might be variable or diffuse, not matching cleanly
to economic models. In this vein, a strength of the cur-
rent results was the use of both ‘‘best-fit’’ and ‘‘resam-
pling’’ approaches to verify that our results are robust
to uncertainty in the model used to calculate economic
preferences. Nor must preferences manifest in changes
in neural activity at the scale used by fMRI: recent work
in monkeys has indicated that activity of neurons within
parietal and posterior cingulate cortices tracks the rela-
tive value and risk of decision options (Dorris and
Glimcher, 2004; McCoy and Platt, 2005a, 2005b; Sugrue
et al., 2004). Thus, the finding of neural differences be-
tween preferences for ambiguity and risk provides
a strong—and somewhat unexpected—grounding for
future studies of their underlying mechanisms.
Of additional interest was the finding that behavioral
impulsiveness covaries with pIFS activation, such that
more impulsive individuals exhibited a smaller neural ef-
fect of ambiguity. That impulsiveness modulates pre-
frontal cortex activation is hardly surprising, given prior
suggestions that a central function of prefrontal cortex is
to inhibit impulsive or automatic behaviors (Miller, 2000)
and that damage to prefrontal cortex (and/or neuro-
transmitter systems that modulate prefrontal cortex) is
associated with increased behavioral impulsiveness
(Best et al., 2002; Parrott, 2000; Walderhaug et al.,
2002). However, the striking and novel result obtained
here was that impulsiveness predicted activation in the
specific region implicated for ambiguity preferences
(but not in the other prefrontal regions or the parietal re-
gion implicated for risk preferences). We emphasize that
the causal direction of this brain-behavior relation is not
established by these data—it is equally plausible that
the behavioral trait of impulsiveness is caused by re-
duced activity in pIFS and other brain regions that sup-
port considering multiple options in decision making. To
identify the direction of causality, one would need to ma-
nipulate impulsiveness directly, as can be done with
pharmacological methods like acute tryptophan deple-
tion (Cools et al., 2005; Walderhaug et al., 2002).
Finally, we speculate that ambiguity aversion reflects
the brain’s implicit recognition of its computational lim-
itations. Most people prefer to make decisions in do-
mains in which they have prior knowledge (i.e., those
in which alternative contexts can be readily brought to
mind) compared to areas with which they are unfamiliar,
even when probabilities are matched between the op-
tions (Heath and Tversky, 1991). Insufficient activation
in pIFS could signify that uncertainty about probability
has not yet been resolved, thus indicating to other brain
systems that the value of an ambiguous decision option
should be discounted.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Thirteen healthy volunteers (nine male; 18–33 years) participated in
two sessions: one fMRI and one in a behavioral laboratory (order
counterbalanced). All acclimated to the fMRI environment with
a mock MRI scanner and participated in a 30 min practice session.
All subjects gave written informed consent as part of a protocol ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board of Duke University Medical
Center.
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Subjects chose between pairs of monetary gambles presented as pie
charts (Figure 1A). Certain gambles showed only one monetary
value, and thus their outcomes were known to the subjects. Risky
gambles presented two monetary values and their associated prob-
abilities. Ambiguous gambles presented two monetary values (one
of which was always $0) but concealed their corresponding probabil-
ities until a choice was made. Outcome probabilities of the ambigu-
ous (risky) gambles ranged from 0 to 1 (0.25 to 0.75) in 0.25 incre-
ments. Expected values for the certain and risky gambles ranged
from $5 to $25 (mean of $14), and expected value was matched within
20% for all gamble pairs. Four pairings of gamble types were pre-
sented with equal frequency: Ambiguous/Certain (AC), Ambiguous/
Risky (AR), Risky/Certain (RC), and Risky/Risky (RR). The labels ‘‘cer-
tain,’’ ‘‘risky,’’ and ‘‘ambiguous’’ were never used within the experi-
ment itself. The experiment was presented with the Psychophysics
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Subjects indicated their choice
on each trial via button press, whereupon the probabilities of any am-
biguous gamble were revealed. The resolution of the gambles and
the display of their outcomes were extended in time after the decision
to allow isolation of decision-specific changes in brain activation.
Study Procedure
At the outset of each trial (Figure 1B), subjects were shown a pair of
gambles. They were asked to select, by pressing a button with their
right hand, the gamble they believed would best maximize their re-
ward outcome on each trial. Upon selection, a blue box surrounded
the chosen gamble, and probabilities were revealed for any Ambig-
uous gambles. Then, after a fixed delay of 2 s, the gambles were re-
solved by spinning small balls around their edges, much like roulette
wheels, for a variable duration of 4.5–6 s. The balls’ speed was ran-
domized across trials to prevent inference about outcome from
starting position. The outcomes of the chosen and unchosen gam-
bles were indicated to the subjects both by the stopping positions
of the balls and by text presented below each gamble for 2 s. The
next trial began after a variable delay of 1.5–7.5 s. During each 9.5
min scan, approximately 28 trials were presented, and subjects par-
ticipated in a mean of 7.2 scans. After completing both the fMRI ses-
sion and a separate behavioral session, subjects were paid accord-
ing to their choices on four gambles selected at random by rolling
dice. Average payout over the four gambles was $60.50, which
was then added to a guaranteed $30 for participation.
Imaging Methods
fMRI data were collected with a gradient-echo spiral-in pulse se-
quence with imaging parameters (TR = 1500 ms, TE = 35 ms, 34 axial
slices parallel to the AC-PC plane, 3.75 3 3.75 3 3.8 mm) on a GE
1.5T scanner with a volume head coil. High-resolution 3D full-brain
SPGR images were acquired to aid in normalization and coregistra-
tion. Functional images were corrected for head motion and time of
acquisition within a TR and were normalized into a standard stereo-
taxic space (Montreal Neurological Institute) for intersubject com-
parison with SPM (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
University College London). A smoothing filter of width 8 mm was
applied after normalization.
To identify activated brain regions, we used event-related fMRI in
conjunction with a multiple regression analysis. A multiple regres-
sion analysis was performed with regressors for each of three trial
components: the decision phase, which spanned the interval be-
tween presentation of the decision stimulus and the subject’s re-
sponse; the expectation phase, which included the spinning of the
gambles until their resolution; and the outcome phase, which was
defined as the TR after resolution of the gambles. Within the decision
phase, separate regressors were used for each of the gamble pair
types and for each possible decision, to allow examination of trial-
type effects. Hypothesized BOLD responses time locked to these
components were modeled by convolution of a canonical hemody-
namic response and its first-order time derivative. Covariates for
head motion and run-mean effects were included in the analyses.
Least-squares parameter estimates were used to construct statisti-
cal parametric maps for each subject, which were then entered into
a second-order random-effects analysis across subjects. Voxel
clusters were counted as significant if the cluster maximum ex-
ceeded a threshold of p < 0.0001, with ten or more contiguous voxels
exceeding a threshold of p < 0.001.Behavioral Data Acquisition and Analysis
Parameters for each subject’s risk and ambiguity preferences were
estimated with their history of choices in both the fMRI and behav-
ioral sessions. For risk, we assumed that the subjects’ preferences
had an expected utility representation. The utility u(x) of a monetary
outcome xR 0 was modeled with a power function (Equation 1).
uðxÞ = xb (1)
Here, b > ( = , <) 1 corresponds to risk-preferring (neutral, averse)
behavior, respectively. For each subject, we calibrated the power
function by finding the value of b that maximized the number of cor-
rect predictions in the RC and RR trials combined. Estimates of
b spanned the range from risk averse to risk seeking, indicating con-
siderable heterogeneity in risk preferences across subjects.
Using the value of b obtained for each individual, we then esti-
mated a second parameter a representing the individual’s ambiguity
preferences. We assumed that individuals evaluate ambiguous
gambles with an a-Maxmin Expected Utility function (Ghirardato
et al., 2004). If subjects believe that both 0 and 1 are possible prob-
abilities for the good outcome, this model reduces to Equation 2.
uðx1; x2Þ = ð12aÞðuðx1ÞÞ+aðuðx2ÞÞ (2)
Here, x1 and x2 are monetary outcomes with x1 > 0 and x2 = 0. This
model suggests that under ambiguity, the decision maker acts as if
he places a weight of a on the expected utility of the choice under
the worst probability distribution and a weight of (1-a) on the ex-
pected utility of the choice under the best probability distribution.
We restricted 0 % a % 1, and consequently, a > ( = , <) 0.5 corre-
sponds to ambiguity-averse (neutral, preferring) behavior, respec-
tively. For each subject, we calibrated Equation 2 and found the
value of a that maximized the number of correct predictions in the
AC and AR trials combined. As in the case of risk, estimates of
a spanned the range from ambiguity averse to ambiguity preferring
behavior. (Note that we plot the quantity 1-a in all figures so that in-
creasing values indicate increasing ambiguity preference, as for
risk.)
This procedure necessarily produces not simply a single parame-
ter estimate, but one or more ranges of feasible parameter values
(for each parameter, three subjects had disjoint ranges). To account
for this potential analytical uncertainty about our subjects’ true pref-
erence parameters, we calculated correlations between brain acti-
vation and preferences with both the mean parameter estimates
and values drawn from the range of possible parameter estimates.
For the latter analysis, we used a resampling approach with 10,000
iterations. On each iteration, we drew ambiguity and risk preference
parameters from the ranges of possible values for each subject,
sampled uniformly. We then calculated the correlations across sub-
jects between each of the two sets of preference parameters and the
fMRI data. We used the proportion of significant samples as an in-
dex of the robustness of the brain-behavior correlation for each
brain region and preference parameter.
We additionally obtained a clinical measure of behavioral impul-
siveness for ten of our 13 subjects with the Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale, or BIS (Patton et al., 1995), for which increasing values indi-
cate increasing impulsiveness. Typical values are approximately
60 6 10 (mean 6 standard deviation) for young-adult college stu-
dents (Patton et al., 1995).
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